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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
PROVO CITY,
Case No. 920202 CA
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
Category No. 2
BRADLEY SPOTTS,
Defendant and Appellant.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Jurisdiction authority is conferred upon the Utah Court of
Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as
amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Was SPOTTS legally seized?

2.

Did the trial court err in admitting statements made by

SPOTTS?
3.

Was the evidence sufficient to support the trial court's

finding of guilty?

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES, ETC.
Constitution of the United States, Amendment IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

Utah Code Annotated, §58-37-8(2)(a)(i), adopted by Provo City
Ordinances as Ordinance No. 9/58-37-8(2)(a)(i).
It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally
to possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly
from a practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this
sub-section.
Utah Code Annotated, §7 6-1-501. Presumption of innocence - "Element
of the offense11 defined.
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to
be innocent until each element of the offense charged
against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In
absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted.
Utah Code Annotated, §77-7-15. Authority of Peace Officer to Stop
and Question Suspects - Grounds.
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting
to commit a public offense and may demand his name,
address, and an explanation of his actions.
Utah Code Annotated, §77-17-3. Discharge for insufficient evidence.
When it appears to the court that there is not
sufficient evidence to put the defendant to his defense,
it shall forthwith order him discharged.
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 30. Errors and defects.
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance
which does not affect the substantial rights of a party
shall be disregarded.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SPOTTS was charged by Information dated October 1, 1991,
alleging a violation date of September 28, 1991.
charged

with

Marijuana.

possession

of

a controlled

(Although the Information

SPOTTS was

substance,

to wit:

charges SPOTTS with a

violation of Provo City Ordinance 9/58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), the citation
to the section in the Information was in error, as it was clear
that the City's theory of the case and the evidence submitted went
only to the crime of simple possession and not to distribution.)
2

SPOTTS appeared pro se before the court on November 20, 1991,
and requested court-appointed counsel.

The court granted the

motion retaining the original trial setting of December 9, 1991,
and giving notice of appointment of counsel to Thomas H. Means on
November 26, 1991.

At the time set for trial, Mr. Means advised

the court that he wished to move to suppress evidence gained as a
result of the stop of SPOTTS1 automobile. The City did not object
and the court allowed that the motion could be reserved and that
hearing on the motion and trial would proceed simultaneously.
Evidence was heard by the court without a jury.

SPOTTS1

motion to suppress evidence and statements derived after the stop
of his vehicle was denied as was his motion for dismissal after the
City had rested its case. The court entered a verdict of guilty to
possession of marijuana.

Final judgment was entered upon the

verdict on February 4, 1992.
February 14, 1992.

SPOTTS filed a Notice of Appeal on

The trial court thereafter granted SPOTTS1

motion for a certificate of probable cause on March 24, 1992.
STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Honorable Lynn W.
Davis, Circuit Court Judge, Fourth Circuit Court, Provo City
Department, State of Utah, rendered on February 4, 1992, upon a
verdict that SPOTTS was guilty of possessing marijuana after trial
on December 9, 1991.
specifically

SPOTTS appeals from such judgment and

from the trial court's denial of his motion to

suppress evidence and statements derived after he was seized by an
officer of the Provo City Police Department.
3

STATEMENT OP THE PACTS
(All references are to pages of the Trial Transcript, i.e., TT. 3)
The facts of this case are brief and essentially undisputed by
the parties.
arresting

A reading of the transcript of the testimony of the

officer

found

on

pages

3 through

18

of

the

trial

transcript as well as the testimony of SPOTTS found on pages 31
through 34 of the trial transcript will give a complete overview of
the facts.

To comply with Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure, SPOTTS nevertheless sets forth the facts as
follows:
On September 28, 1991, Officer Ingrid Weinmuller, a Provo City
police officer, was on a traffic control assignment after a BYU
football game.

At about 3:30 p.m., she was parked facing east at

5600 North University Avenue inside the Eagle Systems1 business
parking lot.

She was in her police uniform but in her private,

unmarked vehicle.

The game had not yet ended and she was waiting

for traffic to pick up (TT. 4-5) .
A red truck pulled into the parking lot and stopped facing
northbound

directly

in front of her vehicle at a distance of

approximately ten (10) feet.

Weinmuller was able to clearly see

into the cab of the truck and observed two (2) white males.
identified SPOTTS as the driver.

She

She noticed that SPOTTS "had a

small, rolled up what appeared to be a joint in his hand and he
took some hits off of it" (TT. 5-6).
She described the "joint" as "smaller than a cigarette and it
was probably one-half (h)
rapidly.

inch long, and he smoked it, it—burned

I could see the orange, as he was inhaling, rapidly
4

disintegrate, not as a cigarette would."

She testified that she

was familiar with what a marijuana joint looked like because of
seeing other friends use it in high school and from her experience
at the POST Academy training (TT. 6).
SPOTTS started to drive away and proceeded about ten (10) feet
when Weinmuller stepped out of her private vehicle and signalled
for him to stop his truck.

She remembered that his windows were

shut, that it was a warm day and that it was daylight.
stopped,

he

opened
an

the

driver's

odor

that

door
she

and

As SPOTTS

Weinmuller

associated

with

could

immediately

smell

burning

marijuana.

She testified that she smelled the smoke from a

distance of about three (3) feet as SPOTTS opened the door and
exhaled (TT. 7-8).
Weinmuller asked SPOTTS to get out of the truck so she could
ask him about the "joint." She noticed his speech was "real slow."
She also had him perform the Gaze-Nystagmus.

She testified that

his eyes appeared bloodshot and that she could still smell a strong
odor of marijuana on his person and on his breath.

She called for

backup and also asked SPOTTS for consent to search his vehicle.
SPOTTS consented. Weinmuller found no evidence in the search. She
testified that SPOTTS had not been out of her sight (TT. 8-9).
In response to the question from the prosecutor, "Do you know
what happened to that item that you saw him smoke?", Weinmuller
responded, "I asked him what had happened to it.
it to his friend."

He said he gave

Weinmuller testified that the other passenger

had exited the truck and walked away when the truck first pulled
5

perpendicularly in front of her vehicle early in the incident.
Upon further direct examination by the prosecution, Weinmuller
stated, "I was asking where the cigarette was, where the marijuana
cigarette was—."

"He said he gave it to his friend."

"I asked

him what he did with it, he said he gave it back to his friend as
he exited the vehicle. I asked him how many hits he had had off of
it, he said a few.

I told him that it was illegal to possess

marijuana and to operate a vehicle while impaired by marijuana, and
he said, 'Do you think I would be driving it if it was going to
effect

my

driving?'"

Weinmuller

then

arrested

SPOTTS

for

possession of marijuana (TT. 10-11).
On cross-examination, Weinmuller clarified that she questioned
SPOTTS and conducted the Gaze-Nystagmus test while SPOTTS stood
outside of his vehicle prior to the arrest.

No blood was drawn

from SPOTTS to determine the existence of marijuana or marijuana
derivatives in his system.

She testified she understood that the

Gaze-Nystagmus test was intended to indicate whether a person's
central nervous system is affected by alcohol or drugs but that she
was not aware if other factors, such as illness, stress, or other
irritants, could also affect a person's response to the GazeNystagmus test (TT. 12-13).
Concerning stopping SPOTTS, Weinmuller testified that "I asked
him to—I motioned for him to stop," that it was her intent for him
to stop, and that she asked him to stop based upon what she had
observed him doing.

She testified that while she observed him

smoking what she believed to be marijuana, she was unable to smell
6

it prior to the stop.

She admitted that tobacco could also be

smoked in the same manner and that she didn't know whether tobacco
would

have

marijuana.

burned

in

any

way

significantly

different

She also admitted that the manner

from

in which the

cigarette burned could be more a factor of the way in which it was
rolled as opposed to the substance that was inside it (TT. 14-15).
On

redirect

examination

by

the

prosecution,

Weinmuller

testified that she had never seen a hand-rolled tobacco cigarette
and that while it was her experience that hand-rolled marijuana
cigarettes burned faster [than commercial cigarettes], she did not
know whether marijuana burned faster than tobacco. She reiterated
that she first smelled the odor of marijuana after SPOTTS' car had
been stopped and he opened the door (TT. 16).
On recross-examination, Weinmuller testified that she stopped
SPOTTS1 truck before she smelled any odors and on the strength of
having seen SPOTTS smoking something that was rolled up and burning
rapidly.

She testified that she saw nothing that would help her

articulate the difference between burning tobacco and burning
marijuana.
burning

When asked to differentiate between the smell of

marijuana

characterized
"offensive."

and

burning

the

smell

marijuana

as

of

burning

"sharp,"

tobacco,

she

"shocking," arid

She also pointed to the characteristics of SPOTTS1

speech as well as his bloodshot eyes as indicators that the
substance was marijuana (TT. 17-18).
SPOTTS was called to testify for the limited purpose of his
Motion to Suppress. He testified that he could see that Weinmuller
7

was uniformed and he stopped because "she got out and said, 'Hold
it1 or something, I didn't quite understand her.
me, what did you say?'
you.'"

I said, 'Excuse

She said, 'Pull over, I want to talk to

When asked if he felt whether he was free to go, he

responded, "Oh, by no means."

He testified that he felt like he

was not free to go because Weinmuller was outside of her car, she
had her hand up, he recognized that she was in a Provo City police
uniform, and she motioned and verbalized something.

He testified

that he would not have stopped had she not motioned and verbalized
as she had (TT. 33-34).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
POINT I
SPOTTS' truck was stopped and he was therefor seized, without
a reasonable and articulable suspicion that he had committed, was
committing, or was about to commit a crime.
POINT II
The trial
statements,

court

erroneously

notwithstanding

admitted

that

the

SPOTTS•

City

had

pre-arrest
failed

to

independently establish a corpus delicti.
POINT III
The evidence admitted at trial was insufficient to establish
the

identity

of the

substance possessed

reasonable doubt.

8

by

SPOTTS beyond a

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SPOTTS1 TRUCK WAS STOPPED AND HE WAS THEREFOR SEIZED, WITHOUT A
REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT HE HAD COMMITTED, WAS
COMMITTING, OR WAS ABOUT TO COMMIT A CRIME.
The Standard of Review.
In State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Ut. 1991), n. #3, the Utah
Supreme Court clarified that threshold constitutional questions are
reviewed in a bifurcated manner.

The subsidiary and factual

determinations are reviewed by a clearly erroneous standard while
the ultimate determination of admissibility is a question of law
reviewed under a correctness standard. This Court has applied the
same bifurcated approach to appeals concerning motions to suppress.
See State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561 (Ut. App. 1991); State v. Lopez,
186 UAR 17 (Ut. App. 1992); and State v. Parker, 189 UAR 3 (Ut.
App. 1992).

The first question in determining whether SPOTTS was legally
seized necessarily involves determining whether or not he was, in
fact, seized.

"[A] person has been 'seized1 within the meaning of

the Fourth Amendment if, in view of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed
that he was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544 (1980) and Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).

"The

test for when the seizure occurred is objective and depends on when
the person reasonably feels detained, not on when the police
officer thinks the person is no longer free to leave."
9

State v.

Ramirez. supra.

A seizure occurs "when a reasonable person, based

on the totality of the circumstances, remains, not in the spirit of
cooperation

with

the

officer's

investigation,

believes he is not free to leave."

but

because

he

State v. Truiillo, 739 P. 2d 85

(Ut. App. 1987); State v. Menke, 797 P.2d 537

(Ut. App. 1990);

State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Ut. App. 1991); State v. Hargraves,
806 P.2d 228 (Ut. App. 1991); State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460 (Ut.
App. 1991); State v. Cornwall, 810 P.2d 484 (Ut. App. 1991); State
v. Davis. 821 P.2d 9 (Ut. App. 1991); and State v. Leonard, 825
P.2d 664 (Ut. App. 1991).
"The stopping of an automobile and the consequent detention of
its occupants constitutes a "seizure1 within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment despite the fact that the purpose of the stop is
limited and the resulting detention quite brief."
Prowse. 440 U.S. 649

Delaware v.

(1979); State v. Cole, 674 P.2d

119 (Ut.

1983); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Ut. App. 1988); United States
v. Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988); State v. Smith, 781 P.2d
879 (Ut. App. 1989); United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812 (10th
Cir. 1991); State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 183 UAR 42 (Ut. App. 1992);
State v. Lovearen. 183 UAR 81 (Ut. App. 1992) ; State v. Lopez,
supra; and State v. Parker, supra.

On the foregoing authority,

SPOTTS was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States, if the automobile he was driving
was stopped by the officer and/or he was objectively reasonable in
his belief that he was not free to go.

10

The evidence is undisputed that SPOTTS originally stopped
voluntarily, although his timing was not good

(TT. 5, 33).

However, after initially stopping on his own to let his passenger
out, and without turning off his motor, SPOTTS then attempted to
proceed (TT. 33). On his attempt to proceed, Officer Weinmuller
signaled for him to pull over by getting out of her vehicle,
motioning with her arm, and verbalizing something (TT. 7, 14, 33,
and 34) .

Weinmuller took the actions that she did because she

intended that SPOTTS stop his truck (TT. 14) .

Likewise, SPOTTS

perceived that Weinmuller wanted him to stop his truck (TT. 33 and
34).

More important, any reasonable person in SPOTTS1 position

would have concluded that he or she was not free to continue to
drive away based upon the following objective factors: As SPOTTS1
truck started to proceed, a uniformed Provo City police officer
stepped out of her vehicle, roughly in line with SPOTTS' direction
of travel, or immediately adjacent thereto, raised her hand,
motioned for him to stop and verbalized for him to stop. Although
no lights or sirens were used, the conditions were such that SPOTTS
could clearly see the actions of the officer and could hear enough
of what she was saying to understand her expressed intent that he
stop his car.
This incident is not typical of traffic stops, but from the
totality of the circumstances, it is clear that SPOTTS was stopped
by a uniformed police officer whom he reasonably perceived did not
want him to go further. SPOTTS reasonably believed that he was not
free to go and was, therefore, seized.
11

"Under Terry, the determination of whether a seizure is
reasonable involves a two-prong test: (1) Was the officer's action
justified at its inception?, and (2) was his action reasonably
related

in

scope

to

the

circumstances

which

justified

the

interference in the first place?" United States v. Terry, 392 U.S.
1 (1968); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Ut. App. 1990); and
State v. Parker, supra.
first prong

SPOTTS challenges his seizure under the

of the Terry

test, claiming

unjustified in its inception.

that his

stop was

SPOTTS further claims that because

the stop was not initially justifiable, all evidence derived as a
result of the stop was tainted and should have been suppressed by
the trial court.
If a seizure occurs and the police are unable to point to
the specific and articulable facts that justified that
seizure, the seizure violates the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, and evidence obtained as a
result of the illegal seizure must be excluded. Terry,
supra, at 15.
The exclusionary rule applies not only to evidence
obtained directly as a result of the illegal seizure, but
also to evidence obtained by exploitation of the
illegality, unless the evidence was obtained by means
"sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary
taint." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963);
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Ut. 1990); and State v.
Ramirez, 817 P. 2d 774 (Ut. 1991).
When

SPOTTS

initially

stopped,

he

did

so

voluntarily.

Consequently, Weinmuller was in a position to observe SPOTTS
legally, at least initially. She also apparently had a clear field
of vision, as she was at a distance of approximately ten (10) feet,
it was mid-afternoon, and the weather was clear (TT. 4-6). From
her position, it was clear that she was observing the Defendant,
12

SPOTTS (TT. 5 and 6).

She watched as SPOTTS smoked from a hand-

rolled cigarette, approximately one-half (h) inch long, that burned
rapidly.

She could see the orange on the end of the cigarette as

he inhaled and could see that it rapidly disintegrated, not as a
normal cigarette would.

She thought from her experience with

friends in high school and from her POST training, that the
cigarette contained marijuana (TT. 6). However, it wasn't until
after she had stopped the vehicle and SPOTTS had opened the door
that she smelled an odor she associated with marijuana (TT. 7, 14
and 17) . Weinmuller was aware that tobacco could be rolled into a
cigarette in a similar fashion but had never seen a hand-rolled
tobacco cigarette and was unaware whether a hand-rolled tobacco
cigarette burned any differently than a hand-rolled marijuana
cigarette.

She testified that the way the cigarette burned could

have been as much a factor of the manner in which it was rolled as
the substance that was inside of it (TT. 14-16).
SPOTTS is aware that "[i]n developing a reasonable articulable
suspicion, law enforcement officers are entitled to reach "common
sense conclusions about human behavior" [United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1 (1989) and State v. Smith, 188 UAR 8 (Ut. App. 1992)]
and that "a trained law enforcement officer may be able to perceive
and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly
innocent to the untrained observer." State v. Truiillo, supra, and
State v. Baumqaertel. 762 P.2d 2 (Ut. App. 1988).

However, this

Court has been traditionally and consistently reluctant to justify
stops based upon a person's conduct that is "consistent with
13

innocent as well as criminal behavior."

State v. Sierra, supra.

This philosophy is represented in the several holdings that have
recognized that nervous behavior when confronted by a police
officer does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.

See, for example, State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P. 2d 652

(Ut. App. 1992); State v. Mendoza/Mendieta, 748 P.2d 181 (Ut.
1987); State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Ut. 1988); State v. Schlosser,
774 P.2d 1132 (Ut. 1989); State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431 (Ut. App.
1990); and State v. Arroyo, supra.

See also State v. Lovegren,

supra, wherein a panel of this Court refused to uphold a detention
based upon a car's interior that had a "lived in" look and the fact
that the occupants wore sunglasses and had a travel map - facts
that the officer had observed in drug courier stops. The Lovegren
Court also noted that the detention could not be based on bloodshot
eyes that are as consistent with dust in one's eyes or lack of
sleep as with the presence of drugs or alcohol.
SPOTTS is likewise aware that this Court has recognized "that
probable cause for arrest may arise from an officer's sense of
smell."

State v. Bart ley, 784 P.2d 1231 (Ut. App. 1989).

More

specifically, this Court has recognized that the "plain view"
doctrine under the Fourth Amendment encompasses the plain smell of
marijuana and marijuana smoke.
(Ut. App. 1992) .

State v. Naisbitt, 827 P. 2d 969

The Naisbitt court cited to numerous federal

decisions holding that the odor of marijuana constitutes probable
cause to search an automobile under the automobile exception. The
reasoning behind this line of federal cases is that "probable cause
14

may be supported by the detection of distinctive odors, as well as
by sight."

United States v. Sifuentes, 504 F.2d 845 (4th Cir.

1974); United States v. Gills, 357 F.2d 299 (4th Cir. 1966); United
States v. Haynie, 637 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 1980); and United States
v. Burrow, 396 F.Sup. 890 (Dis. of Maryland 1975).

What makes

these "plain smell" cases different from Sierra, Arroyo, Lovearen,
and the stop in this case, is the officer's ability to distinguish
criminal conduct from innocent behavior.

In the "plain smell"

cases, the officers pointed to distinct odors. In Sierra, Arroyo,
Lovearen, and this case, the officers observed behavior that they
had associated with criminal activity on other occasions but
behavior which is not distinct from innocent behavior. Here, while
Weinmuller observed activity she had associated with drug use, the
totality of what she observed prior to the stop was also consistent
with innocent behavior.
In State v. Chambers, 687 P.2d 805 (Or. App. 1984), the Court
of Appeals of Oregon faced a factual setting similar to this one.
An officer familiar with controlled substances, narcotics and
dangerous drugs observed an occupant of a car repeatedly lighting
a pipe.

The officer testified he was aware that it is often hard

to keep marijuana or hashish burning in a pipe bowl and, therefore,
stopped the car on the suspicion that the occupant was smoking
either marijuana or hashish.

The Oregon court reasoned that the

fact that pipes must often be relit is probably as attributable to
their design as to the substance being smoked
therefore, refused to validate the stop.
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in them and,

SPOTTS asserts that the officer in Chambers and Officer
Weinmuller in this case would have each had reasonable suspicion to
stop the automobiles had they smelled the distinctive odor of
marijuana prior to the stop. However, the Oregon court was correct
in determining that the officer in Chambers saw nothing that would
distinguish criminal from innocent behavior.

This Court should

also find that prior to stopping SPOTTS' truck, Officer Weinmuller
observed no activity which was inconsistent with innocent behavior
and should therefor find that no reasonable suspicion existed upon
which to base the stop.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY ADMITTED SPOTTS1 PRE-ARREST
STATEMENTS, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE CITY HAD FAILED TO
INDEPENDENTLY ESTABLISH A CORPUS DELICTI.
The Standard of Review.
Rulings on admission of evidence are questions of law reviewed
for correctness, except that the trial court's subsidiary factual
determination should be given deference by the appellate court and
only be overruled when they are clearly erroneous.

State v.

Ramirez, supra, and State v. Taylor, supra. "Even when evidence is
found to be improperly admitted, reversal is only required where
admission of the evidence amounted to prejudicial error." State v.
Dibello. 780 P.2d 1221 (Ut. 1989); State v. Larsen, 775 P.2d 415
(Ut. 1989) and State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032 (Ut. 1987).

"[A]

trial court's ruling that the corpus delicti rule does not bar
admission of the [defendant's] statements is a question of law, and
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accordingly, our standard of review is correctness."

State v.

Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Ut. App. 1991); Rawlins v. Petersen, 813
P.2d 1156 (Ut. 1991); and Landes v. Capital Citv Bank, 795 P.2d
1127 (Ut. 1990).

"The

rule

is

quite

universal

that

an

extra

judicial

confession, by itself, is not sufficient to sustain a conviction of
a crime, but there must be evidence, independent of the confession
to establish the corpus delicti."

State v. Weldon, 314 P. 2d 353

(Ut. 1957) . "Under the Utah corpus delicti rule, before post-crime
inculpatory statements are admissible, the State must show by clear
and convincing evidence that (i) a wrong was done and (ii) such
wrong was the result of criminal conduct."
P.2d

1150

(Ut. 1991).

State v. Johnson, 821

SPOTTS asserts that the City did not

establish by clear and convincing evidence, independent of any of
his statements, that the substance he possessed was a controlled
substance

(and, therefor that

"a wrong was done") and that

consequently none of his statements should have been admitted.
After he was seized but before he was taken into custody,
SPOTTS had a dialogue with Officer Weinmuller about the cigarette.
Regarding that conversation, Officer Weinmuller testified, "I asked
him what had happened to it.

He said he gave it to his friend."

Later, still on direct examination, Weinmuller testified, "Well,
yeah, I was talking with him, I was asking where the cigarette was,
where the marijuana cigarette was—."

She explained that SPOTTS

responded, "He said he gave it to his friend."
17

She testified

further, "I asked him what he did with it, he said he gave it back
to his friend as he exited the vehicle.

I asked him how many hits

he had had off of it, he said a few.

I told him that it was

illegal to possess marijuana and to operate a vehicle while
impaired by marijuana, and he said, [']Do Y o u think I would be
driving if it was going to effect my driving?[•]"
SPOTTS1

statements,

to

the

extent

that

(TT. 10-11).
they

are

even

inculpatory, should not have been admitted because without them,
the prosecution was unable to establish, by clear and convincing
evidence, that he possessed an identifiable amount of marijuana.
Absent the statement, the prosecution had established that
Officer Weinmuller had observed SPOTTS smoking a small, rolled up
cigarette about one-half (h) inch long that burned rapidly. After
she had waived him over, she smelled the odor of what she had
experienced to be marijuana. She observed his speech was slow, his
eyes were bloodshot and that his eye movements were very jerky (TT.
6-9) . But she did not discover any substance that clearly and
convincingly appeared to be marijuana.
As noted above, this Court in State v. Naisbitt, supra, ruled
that

the

"plain view"

exception

under

the

encompasses evidence within plain smell.
concluded
established

that

officers

probable

who

cause

smell

for

a

Amendment

The Naisbitt court

burning

search

Fourth

marijuana

under

the

have

federal

interpretation of the automobile exception. But the Naisbitt court
did not go further and rule that the smell of marijuana smoke can
also support proof of the existence of marijuana.
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In fact, in

footnote 8 of its decision, the Naisbitt court stated, "[w]e make
no statement as to whether our decision would be the same if
Trooper Bushnell's search had not, in fact, found marijuana in the
vehicle."
SPOTTS concedes that Officer Weinmuller had established proper
probable cause for a search, but nothing more.

In ruling on

SPOTTS1 motion to suppress evidence of his statements, the court
stated, "I believe there is still a prima facie case in terms of
what the officer observed, characteristics that were consistent
with [the] use of drugs and the—the distinctive smell that was
emanating from his person,...11 However, since everything that the
officer had observed was just as consistent with innocent as with
criminal behavior (i.e. the "marijuana" cigarette could not be
distinguished from a tobacco cigarette, bloodshot eyes are as
consistent with dirt in one's eyes or with being tired as with
criminal behavior) and because the odor of marijuana establishes
only probable cause for a search, the court had nothing before it
from which to conclude, absent the statements, that marijuana was
actually present.
If

this

Court

concludes

that

SPOTTS1

statements

were

erroneously admitted, it must also rule that such error was not
harmless, as the trial court found that the statements were
critical to its guilty verdict.

Rule 30(a) of the Utah Rules of

Criminal Procedure provides: "Any error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect the substantial rights of the
parties shall be disregarded."
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SPOTTS1 statements were admitted with absolutely no direct
evidence offered or admitted on the identity of the substance he
was alleged to have possessed.

Admittedly Weinmuller established

probable cause for a search but ultimately discovered nothing that
confirmed her suspicions or that provided clear and convincing
proof of the actual existence of a controlled substance.

The

nature of SPOTTS' statements turned the trial court in favor of a
finding of guilt. In stating its findings prior to entering its
verdict, the trial court commented on SPOTTS' argument that a
conviction required that there be some marijuana introduced into
evidence, or at least a competent analysis of the substance or of
the blood of SPOTTS to establish the presence of marijuana.

The

court responded "I think that would be true if there was not an
admission on the part of the defendant,....

If he did not respond

or simply said it was tobacco, then I frankly think that the City
has to produce something" (TT. 4 3-44).

The trial court obviously

found that the conviction rested on SPOTTS1 failure to adamantly
refute Weinmullerfs characterization of the cigarette and on his
statements which it mistakenly referred to as "admissions".
Court

should

therefore

determine

the

trial

court

This

committed

reversible error because the error in admitting SPOTTS1 statements
was not so "inconsequential

that

. . . there is no reasonable

likelihood that the error effected the outcome of the proceedings."
State v Kniaht. 734 P.2d 913 (Utah, 1987).

20

POINT III
THE EVIDENCE ADMITTED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF THE SUBSTANCE POSSESSED BY SPOTTS
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
The Standard of Review,
A. At the close of the City's evidence, SPOTTS made a motion
to dismiss

(TT. 19-22).

Section 77-17-3, Utah Code Annotated

controls rulings on such motions and provides "[w]hen it appears to
the court that there is not sufficient evidence to put a defendant
to his defense, it shall forthwith order him discharged."
"When a motion for a directed verdict is made at the close of the
[prosecution's] case, the trial court should dismiss the charge if
the [prosecution] did not establish a prima facie case against the
defendant by producing 'believable evidence of all of the elements
of the crime charged.'"

State v. Emmett, 184 UAR 34 (Ut. 1992).

See also State v. Taylor, supra.
B. SPOTTS also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in
support of the ultimate verdict. "In reviewing the sufficiency of
the evidence at a bench trial, as occurred here, [the appellate
court] will not set aside the verdict unless clearly erroneous, and
where the result is against the clear weight of the evidence, or
[the

appellate

court]

otherwise

reaches

conviction that a mistake has been made.

a

definite

and

firm

State v. Walker, 743 P. 2d

191 (Ut. 1987); State v. Pelton. 801 P.2d 184 (Ut. App. 1990);
State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474 (Ut. 1991); State v. Pedersen, 802
P.2d 1328 (Ut. App. 1990); State v. Strieby, 790 P.2d 98 (Ut. App.
1990); and State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 (Ut. App. 1987).
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Marshalling.
When challenging the findings of fact of the trial court on
appeal, the appellant must show that the findings of fact were
clearly erroneous.

In order to show clear error, the appellant

must marshall all of the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to
support the findings against an attack. State v. Moosman, supra;
State v. Moore, 801 P.2d 732 (Ut. App. 1990)

"Due process requires the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime
charged."

State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466 (Ut. App. 1988).

"We

will not make "speculative leaps across...remaining gaps' in the
evidence. Every element of the crime charged must be proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.

If the evidence does not support those

elements, the verdict must fail."
(Ut.

App. 1989) and

State v. Harmon, 767 P.2d 567

State v. Striebv, supra.

"Utah Code

Annotated, §76-1-501 requires that each element of a criminal
offense be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. James, 819
P.2d 781 (Ut. 1991) and State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Ut. 1991).
In this matter, SPOTTS is specifically charged with possessing a
controlled substance, to wit: Marijuana.

"Where possession of

narcotics is the jest of the offense charged, the government must
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance involved is
that specified in the indictment." State v. Schofill, 621 P. 2d 364
22

(HI 1980).

Therefore, if SPOTTS• conviction is to stand, the City

must have introduced some believable evidence on the identity of
the substance allegedly possessed to survive SPOTTS1 motion for
dismissal at the close of their evidence, and must have proven
beyond a reasonable doubt the identity of marijuana in SPOTTS1
possession in order to sustain the ultimate finding of guilt.
The evidence that was available to the trial court on the
issue of the identification of the substance allegedly possessed by
SPOTTS is as follows:

SPOTTS was observed smoking a one-half

(h)

inch long hand-rolled cigarette that burned rapidly (TT. 6 ) . The
officer smelled a strong odor that she associated with marijuana
about his person (TT. 7-9).
were bloodshot and jerky.

He talked "real slow," and his eyes

SPOTTS admitted to giving whatever it

was that he had smoked to his friend and he did not unequivocally
challenge

Officer

Weinmullerfs

marijuana cigarette (TT. 10-11).

characterization

of

it

as

a

The time of the occurrence was

approximately 3:30 p.m. on Saturday, September 28, 1991 (TT. 4 ) .
The business where the incident took place was not open and there
were no other vehicles in the parking lot (TT. 18).
Although it does not appear that Utah has ever set forth a
precise

quantum

or method

for establishing

the

identity

of a

suspected controlled substance, in State v. Winters, 396 P.2d 872
(Ut. 1964) and State v. Warner, 788 P.2d 1041 (Ut. App. 1990), both
the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals rejected the
"useability" argument.
for the holding that

The Warner court quoted the Winters' court

lf

[t]he determinative test is possession of a
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narcotic drug, and not useability of a narcotic drug."

In both

Winters and Warner an identif icible amount of a controlled substance
was seized by an officer and analyzed by a chemist.

Both of these

cases imply that at lease "some" amount must have been observed and
must have been competently identified.

This would be consistent

with other jurisdictions that require an identifiable amount.
Regardless of the amount, however minute, if it is enough
for the officers to recover, as small as it may be, and
capable of being identified by expert chemical analysis,
such testimony would be sufficiently considered with
other evidence as to possession. J.D. Partain v. The
State, 288 SE.2d 292 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976).
If the controlled substance can be seen and measured, we
conclude that the amount is sufficient to establish the
defendant knew it was a controlled substance. Thomas v.
State, 807 SW.2d 786 (Tx. Ct. App. 1991).
A review of the law from other jurisdictions reveals a
majority of jurisdictions hold possession of the residue
of a contraband drug, so long as the residue is capable
of being identified, is sufficient to support a
conviction for possession. State v. Robinson, 411 SE.2d
678 (S. Ca. Ct. App. 1991).
In

State

v.

Miller.

supra,

this

Court

sustained

the

identification of a controlled substance (marijuana) that had been
seized pursuant to search warrant. The trial court had found the
substance

properly

identified

on

the

strength

of

objective

observations of a professional narcotics agent and scientific
tests.

It is not clear whether the marijuana was introduced at

trial.

In State v. Hull, 487 P.2d 1314 (Mont. 1971), the seized

controlled substance was analyzed but not introduced at trial.
Instead, the results of the analysis were introduced by the
chemist. That court ruled, "[w]e are aware of no requirement that
the alleged dangerous drug must be introduced at the trial."
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In

Corry

v.

State,

543

P.2d

565

(Okl.

Ct.

App.

1975),

the

identification of marijuana was upheld on the testimony of the
sheriff who seized the substance and identified it based on his
police training on the subject and experience with the substance in
the course of police investigations.

No chemical analysis was

performed in this case.
Utah

has

little

case

law

on

identification of a controlled substance.
cases

from

Utah

and

other

the

requirements

for

However, the foregoing

jurisdictions

indicate

that

identification has been upheld regardless of whether there was a
useable amount, regardless of whether the substance was introduced
at trial, and regardless of whether or not an expert qualified by
formal scientific education gave an opinion.

But, an important

common thread that runs through all of these cases is that in each,
an identifiable quantum of the alleged controlled substance was
observed and seized and either analyzed by an expert or otherwise
competently identified by someone who examined the seized substance
and who was familiar with the illicit substance by experience or
education. In contrast, in this case, no substance was observed or
seized

or

compared

to

a

known

illicit

substance

and

the

"identification" of the substance was based on facts that are
arguably sufficient to establish probable cause but which have not
been found to support a conviction in any other case discovered by
SPOTTS.
Utah

upholds

criminal

circumstantial evidence.

convictions

based

on

purely

State v. Span. 819 P.2d 329 (Ut. 1991);
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State v. Nickles. 728 P.2d 123 (Ut. 1986); State v. Franks, 649
P.2d 3 (Ut. 1982); and State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723 (Ut. 1982).
Similarly, in State v. Hutton, 502 P.2d 1037 (Wa. Ct. App. 1972),
the Washington Court of Appeals recognized "ample authority for the
proposition

that the

identity

of a drug,

in a possession

or

distribution case, can be established by circumstantial evidence."
That

court

went

on

to

say,

" [o]rdinarily, however,

not

only

prudence but necessity as well would dictate that some expression
of

opinion

through

expertise,

acquired

through

education

or

experience, be expressed to support the identity of the substance
possessed or distributed."

That court reversed a conviction for

distribution of amphetamine that had been based on the testimony of
a lay person who had testified that defendant gave her a white
flaky substance, which gave her a "tingling" feeling, and that she
had "heard" the substance was speed.

She also testified that on a

later occasion, she had asked the defendant "for some speed" and he
gave her a substance that made her feel "a little high."
substance nor analysis was introduced at trial.

No

The Washington

Court of Appeals found the lay person's opinion insufficient to
establish the identity of the substance.
In a line of federal controlled substance cases involving fact
situations where

substances had

been consumed

or

distributed,

federal courts have held that "lay testimony and circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient, without the introduction of an expert
chemical

analysis, to establish the identity

involved in an alleged narcotics transaction."
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of the

substance

United States v.

Gregorio, 497 F.2d

1253

(4th Cir. 1984).

In United States v.

Dolan, 544 F.2d 1219 (4th Cir. 1976), the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals set out six (6) factors that may be included in sufficient
circumstantial proof of the identity of a controlled substance: (a)
evidence of the physical appearance of the substance involved, (b)
evidence that the substance produced the expected effects when
sampled by someone familiar with the elicit drug, (c) evidence that
the substance was used in the same manner as the elicit drug, (d)
testimony that a high price was paid in cash for the substance, (e)
evidence that transactions involving the substance were carried out
in secrecy or deviousness, and (f) evidence that the substance was
called by the name of the illegal narcotic by the defendant or
others in his presence.

See also United States v. Scott, 725 F.2d

43 (4th Cir. 1984).
Other federal circuit courts of appeal have similarly ruled
that

the

identification

of

a

controlled

substance

can

be

established by circumstantial evidence:
Illegal drugs will often be unavailable for scientific
analysis because their nature is to be consumed... .To our
knowledge,
no
court
has
held
that
scientific
identification of a substance is an absolute prerequisite
to conviction for a drug-related offense, and we too are
unwilling to announce such a rule.
In view of the
limitations
that
such
a burden would
place
on
prosecutors, and in accordance with general evidentiary
principles, courts have held that the government may
establish the identity of a drug through cumulative
circumstantial evidence. United States v. Schrock, 855
F.2d 327 (6th Cir. 1988). See also, United States v.
Osgood, 794 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Meeks, 857 F.2d 1201 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Eakes, 783 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1986) ; and United States v.
Brown. 887 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1989).
While these holdings don't specifically set out the same six (6)
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factors as Dolan, those same factors are nevertheless present in
the facts of each of these cases.
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted the Dolan sixpoint test for the establishment of the identity of a controlled
substance by circumstantial evidence. In United States v. Sanchez
De Fundora. 893 F.2d 1173 (10th Cir. 1990), the court stated:
The government need not introduce scientific evidence to
prove the identity of a substance. As long as there is
sufficient lay testimony or circumstantial evidence from
which a jury could find that a substance was identified
beyond a reasonable doubt, the lack of scientific
evidence does not warrant reversal. Sanchez-De Fundura,
at 1175.
The court went on to examine and explain how the six-point Dolan
test had been complied with in each of Sanchez De Fundora's eight
(8) separate counts of distribution of cocaine.
However, United States v. Baggett, 890 F.2d 1095 (10th Cir.
1989), shows that the 10th Circuit recognizes there are limitations
to the use of circumstantial evidence to establish the identity of
a controlled substance.

In Baggett, the 10th Circuit Court cited

the six-point Dolan test with authority but reversed Baggett's
conviction for possession of a controlled substance.

It did so,

stating:
It is not necessary that the Government have direct
evidence to support a conviction for possession. But
where, as in this case, the Government fails to seize and
analyze the chemical composition of the alleged narcotic
substance, there must be enough circumstantial evidence
to support an inference that the defendant actually did
possess the drugs in question. Baggett, at 1096.
....

If the prosecution is not going to present direct
evidence of drug possession, its circumstantial evidence
must include some testimony linking defendant to an
observed substance that a jury can infer to be a
narcotic. Baggett, at 1097. (Emphasis added.)
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Baggett's telephone conversations with a suspected drug dealer
had been intercepted and she had been heard to arrange for the
purchase of cocaine and heroin.

Later, Baggett was observed

meeting with the drug dealer at the pre-arranged location.
However, no government witness testified to having seen a substance
that appeared to be a controlled substance, or that the substance
produced effects similar to a known controlled substance, or that
the substance was used in the same manner as an elicit drug, or
that any money was exchanged.

The government's case consisted

primarily of the secrecy of Baggett's actions in meeting with a
suspected drug dealer coupled with her having referred to cocaine
and heroin in the intercepted telephone calls in which she arranged
for the meeting. The 10th Circuit found the totality of the
circumstantial

evidence insufficient to support a conviction,

stating:
Courts typically require much stronger evidence before
holding it sufficient to meet the Government's burden of
proof. See, e.g., Scott, 725 F.2d at 46 (finding that
"[e]very fact listed in Dolan for establishing
circumstantially the illegal character of the [substance]
possessed by the defendant was present). Baggett, at
1097.
Just as with the state cases cited above, there is a common
thread running through these federal cases in which convictions
were upheld. Although no drugs were seized or introduced at trial,
in each successful conviction, there was "an observed substance"
that was competently identified beyond a reasonable doubt by the
testimony of a witness who observed it and by application of the
six-point Dolan test or a similarly strict standard.
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If the six-point Dolan test were applied to this case, SPOTTS
conviction would fail.

As in Baggett, there was no observed

substance. No witness testified that the physical appearance of an
observed substance was consistent with the physical appearance of
a known controlled substance; no one familiar with the illicit drug
testified to sampling the observed substance and concluding that it
produced effects similar to the illicit drug; no testimony was
admitted that a high price was paid in cash for the substance;
and,

importantly,

the

"drug"

was

not

used

in

secrecy

or

deviousness, but was smoked openly in broad daylight in full view
of Officer Weinmuller's car that was presumably at least as
noticeable to SPOTTS as SPOTTS1 truck was to Weinmuller.
The only evidence introduced by the City that meets any of the
factors of the six point Dolan test was that a) the substance
appeared to be used in the same manner as marijuana and b) SPOTTS
did not adamantly challenge Weinmuller's characterization of his
cigarette as a marijuana cigarette.

And, of course, SPOTTS

challenges the admissibility of his statements. Even assuming the
statements were properly admitted, neither SPOTTS nor his companion
made any incriminating references such that it can be inferred that
SPOTTS either made or acquiesced in statements against his own
interest. Rather,

the

references

to marijuana

were made by

Weinmuller in an accusatory or investigatory context, after SPOTTS
was seized.
At best, the City proved only that SPOTTS smoked from a handrolled cigarette that looked like a marijuana "joint", that he had
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about

him

a

smell

that

Weinmuller

associated

with

burning

marijuana, and that his eyes were bloodshot and his speech "real
slow". No evidence was offered to establish the physical appearance
of an observed substance, nor that the substance produced an effect
similar to that expected from marijuana, nor that the substance was
exchanged for an inordinately high price, nor that the substance
was used secretively (in fact it is clear the use was open and
notorious), nor that SPOTTS or his companion called the substance
by the name of an illegal narcotic. The facts of this case do not
remotely

approach

the

level

of

the

evidence

supporting

the

foregoing successful federal prosecutions for controlled substance
violations based on circumstantial evidence. Rather, the facts of
this case are more factually similar to the facts of Baggett.
With this case, this Court can decide what quantum and manner
of proof is required for the establishment of the identity of a
controlled substance.

Under any of the foregoing tests, this

particular case must be reversed. However, this Court should take
the

opportunity

to

set

a

standard

for

future prosecutions.

Hopefully, that standard will require the introduction of the
seized suspected controlled substance as well as the introduction
of a competent chemical analysis supported by the opinion of an
expert qualified by formal scientific education to analyze and
identify the substance.
this

Court

rules

that

Alternatively - but not preferably - if
a

conviction

does

not

require

the

introduction of either the controlled substance or a chemical
analysis, at the very least, there should be evidence linking
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Defendant to an observed substance that can be circumstantially
identified by application of a test at least as rigorous as the
six-point Dolan test.

This Court should not uphold convictions

based not on an observed and competently identified substance, but
on the theory that "where there is smoke, there is fire."

CONCLUSIONS
SPOTTS was illegally seized; all evidence derived from that
seizure should be ordered suppressed, SPOTTS1 statements should
have been suppressed as the City failed to independently establish
a corpus delecti. This Court should find the evidence insufficient
to

support

the

ultimate

reversing the conviction.

judgment

and

should

enter

its

order

"Double jeopardy bars the retrial of a

defendant when an appellate court declares the evidence to be
insufficient to sustain a conviction."

Burks v. United States, 437

U.S. 1 (1978); Greene v. Massev. 437 U.S. 1 (1978); State v. Webb.
779 P.2d 1108 (Ut. 1989); and State v. Sorenson, supra.
DATED this

^ Q T ^ v day of July, 1992.

THOMAfe if. MEANS
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, four (4)
copies of the foregoing Brief of Defendant-Appellant to Gary
Gregorson and Vernon F. Romney, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee,
at P.O. Box 1849, Provo, UT 84603, this
~~2^~X„ day of July, 1992.
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ADDENDUM
Constitution of the United States, Amendment IV
Provo City Ordinances, 9/58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
Utah Code Annotated, §58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
Utah Code Annotated, §76-1-501
Utah Code Annotated, §77-7-15
Utah Code Annotated, §77-17-3
Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)(d)
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(7)
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 30(a)
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Amend. Ill

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

446

AMENDMENT III

AMENDMENT X

[Quartering soldiers.l
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

[Powers reserved to states or people.]
The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

11

AkENDMENTIV

[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
1

AMENDMENT XI
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial
power.]
The judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.

AMklNlMiM v

AMENDMENT XII

[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning —
Due process of law and just compensation
clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.

[Election of President and Vice-President.]
The Electors shall meet in their respective states,
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President,
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of
the same state with themselves; they shall name in
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons
voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each,
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit
sealed to the seat of the Government of the United
States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the
Senate and House of Representatives, open all the
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The»
person having the greatest number of votes for Presi^
dent, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and
if no person have such majority, then from the per^.
sons having the highest numbers not exceeding three
on the list of those voted for as President, the House
of Representatives shall choose immediately, by bal-^
lot, the President. But in choosing the President, the^
votes shall be taken by states, the representation^
from each state having one vote; a quorum for thif^
purpose shall consist of a member or members from'
two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the
states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House
of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the
Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case rf
the death or other constitutional disability of the
President.—The person having the greatest number
of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-Prosi*
dent, if such number be a majority of the whole num^
her of Electors appointed, and if no person have.t*
majority, then from the two highest numbers on wi
list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President^
quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thiW»j
the whole number of Senators, and a majority of Ug
whole number shall be necessary to a choice. Batggj
person constitutionally ineligible to the office °^^?fe
ident shall be eligible to that of Vice-President ofWl
United States.

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
AMENDMENT VII
[Trial by jury in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
AMENDMENT VHI
[Bail — Punishment]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.
AMENDMENT IX
[Rights retained by people.]
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.

AMENDMENT XIII
Section
1. [Slavery prohibited.]
2. [Power to enforce amendment.]
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OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS

under this subsection is guilty of a third defelon
rohTbTted ax*
(2) Prohibited
acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid
prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized
TnMor any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place
knowingly and intentionally to permit them
to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation of this chapter and the use or possession
is open, obvious, apparent, and not concealed
from those present; however, a person may
not be convicted under this subsection if the
evidence shows that he did not use the substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist
anyone else to do so; any incidence of prior
unlawful use of controlled substances by the
defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense;
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled
substance;
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this
chapter knowingly mid intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled
substance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in Section 78-14-5
of a parent, guardian, or person standing in
loco parentis of the juvenile except in cases
of an emergency; for purposes of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in
Section 78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any
physical condition requiring the administration of a controlled substance for immediate
relief of pain or suffering;
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this
chapter knowingly and intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled
substance in excess of medically recognized
quantities necessary to treat the ailment,
malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any controlled substance to
another person knowing that the other person is using a false name, address, or other
personal information for the purpose of securing the same,
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds
or more, is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or
II, or marijuana, if the amount is more than
16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty
of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in
the form of an extracted resin from any part
of the plant, and the amount is more than

>

t J O - « J • ~K*

one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty
of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries
of property occupied by any correctional facility
as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or
other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a
penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2Kb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of
possession of any controlled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection (2)(b),
that person shall be sentenced to a one degree
greater penalty than provided in this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates Subsection
(2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii),
or (iii), including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a
second conviction for possession of a controlled
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon
a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2)(a)(ii) through (2)(a)(vii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B
misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class
A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction,
guilty of a third degree felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person:
(i) who is subject to this chapter^to distribute or dispense a controlled substance in violation of this chapter;
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance to
another licensee or other authorized person
not authorized by his license;
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a
symbol required by this chapter or by a rule
issued under this chapter;
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or furnish any record, notification, order form,
statement, invoice, or information required
under this chapter; or
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for
inspection as authorized by this chapter.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) shall be punished by a civil penalty of
not more than $5,000. The proceedings are independent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chapter or any other law of this
state. If the violation is prosecuted by information or indictment which alleges the violation
was committed knowingly or intentionally, that
person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree
felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly
and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture
or distribution of a controlled substance a
license number which is fictitious, revoked,
suspended, or issued to another person or, for
the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent
himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler,
apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian,
or other authorized person;
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afferent ways under different provisions of this code,
he act shall be punishable under only one such provi. a n acquittal or conviction and sentence under
?
v such provision bars a prosecution under any
other such provision.
<2) Whenever conduct may establish separate of- s e s under a single criminal episode, unless the
-oiirt otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant
^hall not be subject to separate trials for multiple
offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a
single court, and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting
attorney at the time the defendant is arraigned
on the first information or indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less
than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as
a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the
jury with respect to an included offense unless there
is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the
included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or
judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the offense charged
but that there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of
that included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment
of conviction entered for the included offense, without
necessity of a new trial, if such relief is sought by the
defendant.
1974
76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution for offense out of
same episode.
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or
more offenses arising out of a single criminal episode,
a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different
offense arising out of the same criminal episode is
barred if:
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have been tried under
Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution;
and
(b) The former prosecution:
(i) resulted in acquittal; or
(ii) resulted in conviction; or
(iii) was improperly terminated; or
(iv) was terminated by a final order or
judgment for the defendant that has not been
reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be established to
secure conviction in the subsequent prosecution.
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted
J
n a finding of not guilty by the trier of facts or in a
determination that there was insufficient evidence to

76-1-501

warrant conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser
included offense is an acquittal of the greater offense
even though the conviction for the lesser included
offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated.
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted
in a judgment of guilt that has not been reversed, set
aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not been
reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of
supporting a judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by
the court.
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termination takes place before the verdict,
is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and
takes place after a jury has been impanelled and
sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury trial is
waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, termination of prosecution is not improper if:
(a) The defendant consents to the termination;
or
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to
the termination;
(c) The court finds and states for the record
that the termination is necessary because:
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed
with the trial in conformity with the law; or
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the state that would
make any judgment entered upon a verdict
reversible as a matter of law; or
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the
courtroom not attributable to the state
makes it impossible to proceed with the trial
without injustice to the defendant or the
state; or
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a
verdict; or
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire
prevent a fair trial.
1974
76-1-404. Concurrent jurisdiction — Prosecution in other jurisdiction barring prosecution in state.
If a defendant's conduct establishes the commission
of one or more offenses within the concurrent jurisdiction of this state and of another jurisdiction, federal
or state, the prosecution in the other jurisdiction is a
bar to a subsequent prosecution in this state if (1) the
former prosecution resulted in an acquittal, conviction, or termination of prosecution, as those terms are
defined in Section 76-1-403, and (2) the subsequent
prosecution is for the same offense or offenses.
1973
76-1-405. Subsequent prosecution not barred —
Circumstances.
A subsequent prosecution for an offense shall not
be barred under the following circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution was procured by
the defendant without the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney bringing the subsequent prosecution and with intent to avoid the sentence that
might otherwise be imposed; or
(2) The former prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt held invalid in a subsequent proceeding on writ of habeas corpus, coram nobis, or
similar collateral attack.
1973
PART 5
RITRDFN OF PROOF
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — "Element of the offense" defined.
I ( D A defendant in a criminal proceeding is pre-
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76-1-502

sumed to be innocent until each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant
shall be acquitted.
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the
offense" mean:
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or
results of conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of t h e offense;
(b) The culpable mental state required.
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not
elements of the offense b u t shall be established by a
preponderance of the evidence.
1973
1

76-1-502. Negating defense b y allegation or
proof — When n o t required.
Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a defense:
(1) By allegation in a n information, indictment, or other charge; or
(2) By proof, unless:
(a) The defense is in issue in the case as a
result of evidence presented a t trial, either
by t h e prosecution or t h e defense; or
(b) The defense is a n affirmative defense,
and t h e defendant has presented evidence of
such affirmative defense.
1973

(b) t h e actor represents to the v i S J
verbally or in any other m a n n e r that he ITS
control of such a n item.
*T
(6) "Offense" means a violation of any pejJ
statute of this state.
,jjj
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act *Jwl
there is a legal duty to act a n d t h e actor is catTf
ble of acting.
,j±J
(8) "Person" means a n individual, pubUclL!
private corporation, government, p a r t n e r s l u ^ J
unincorporated association.
"•%.!
(9) "Possess" means to have physical
sion of or to exercise dominion or control o]
tangible property.
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily^
jury that creates or causes serious pe
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairm<
the function of any bodily member or organj
creates a substantial risk of death.
CHAPTER 2
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Part 1
Culpability Generally

76-1-503. Presumption of fact.
An evidentiary presumption established by this
code or other penal statute h a s t h e following consequences:
(1) When evidence of facts which support the
presumption exist, t h e issue of t h e existence of
the presumed fact must be submitted to the jury
unless the court is satisfied t h a t the evidence a s a
whole clearly negates the presumed fact;
(2) In submitting the issue of the existence of a
presumed fact to the jury, t h e court shall charge
t h a t while t h e presumed fact must on all evidence be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, t h e
law regards the facts giving rise to the presumption a s evidence of the presumed fact.
1973

Section
76-2-101.

76-1-504. Affirmative defense presented by defendant.
Evidence of a n affirmative defense a s defined by
this code or other statutes shall be presented by t h e
defendant.
1973

76-2-201.
76-2-202.

PART 6
DEFINITIONS
76-1-601. Definitions.
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title:
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement
and includes speech.
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in a criminal action.
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.
(4) "Conduct" means a n act or omission.
(5) "Dangerous weapon" means any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury, or a
facsimile or representation of the item, and:
(a) t h e actor's use or apparent intended
use of t h e item leads the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death
or serious bodily injury; or

76-2-102.
76-2-103.

76-2-104.

Requirements of criminal conduct*
criminal responsibility.
Culpable mental state required^
Strict liability.
Definitions of "intentionally, or
intent or willfully"; "knowingly^
with knowledge"; "recklessly,^
maliciously"; a n d "criminal ne
gence or criminally negligent.'
Conduct — When defined a s oflfei
Part 2

Criminal Responsibility for Conduct of
Another

76-2-203.
76-2-204.
76-2-205.

Definitions.
Criminal responsibility for direct <
mission of offense or for conduct!
another.
Defenses unavailable in prosecutio
based on conduct of another.
Criminal responsibility of corporate
or association.
Criminal responsibility of person f
conduct in n a m e of corporation'J
association.
Part 3

Defenses to Criminal Responsibility
76-2-301.
76-2-302.
76-2-303.
76-2-304.
76-2-304.5.
76-2-305.

76-2-306.

Person under fourteen years old nofl
criminally responsible.
Compulsion.
Entrapment.
Ignorance or mistake of fact or la*
Mistake as to victim's age not a
fense.
Mental illness — Use as a defense <
Influence of alcohol or other sulj
stance voluntarily consumed inition.
Voluntary intoxication.
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same manner under it as if he had an original warrant.
1»80
77-7-11. P o s s e s s i o n of warrant b y arresting officer not required.
Any peace officer who has knowledge of an outstanding warrant of arrest may arrest a person he
reasonably believes to be the person described in the
warrant, without the peace officer having physical
possession of the warrant.
1980
77-7-12. Detaining p e r s o n s s u s p e c t e d of shoplifting or library theft — Persons authorized.
(1) A peace officer, merchant, or merchant's employee, servant, or agent who has reasonable grounds
to believe that goods held or displayed for sale by the
merchant have been taken by a person with intent to
steal may, for the purpose of investigating the unlawful act and attempting to effect a recovery of the
goods, detain the person in a reasonable manner for a
reasonable length of time.
(2) A peace officer or employee of a library may
detain a person for the purposes and under the limits
of Subsection (1) if there are reasonable grounds to
believe the person violated Part 8, Chapter 6, Title
76, Library Theft.
1987
77-7-13. Arrest w i t h o u t warrant b y p e a c e officer — Reasonable grounds, what constitutes — Exemption from civil or
criminal liability.
(1) A peace officer may arrest, without warrant,
any person [that] he has reasonable ground to believe
has committed a theft under Part 8, Chapter 6, Title
76, Library Theft, or of goods held or displayed for
sale.
(2) A charge of theft made to a peace officer under
Part 8, Library Theft, by an employee of a library, or
by a merchant, merchant's employee, servant, or
agent constitutes a reasonable ground for arrest, and
the police officer is relieved from any civil or criminal

77-7-iy

77-7-16. Authority of peace officer to frisk suspect for dangerous weapon —
Grounds.
A peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily for questioning may frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes he or any other
person is in danger.
isso
77-7-17. Authority of peace officer to take possession of weapons.
A peace officer who finds a dangerous weapon pursuant to a frisk may take and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either return it if lawfully possessed, or arrest such
person.
i»80
77-7-18. Citation on misdemeanor or infraction
charge.
A peace officer, in lieu of taking a person into custody, any public official of any county or municipality
charged with the enforcement of the law, and personnel employed at an inspection and checking station or
port of entry under Section 27-12-19 may issue and
deliver a citation requiring any person subject to arrest or prosecution on a misdemeanor or infraction
charge to appear at the court of the magistrate before
whom the person should be taken pursuant to law if
the person had been arrested.
1990

77-7-19. Appearance required by citation — Arrest for failure to appear — Transfer of
cases — Motor vehicle violations —
Disposition of fines and costs [Effective until January 1, 19921.
(1) Persons receiving misdemeanor citations shall
appear before the magistrate designated in the citation on or before the time and date specified in the
citation.
(2) A citation may not require a person to appear
sooner than five days or later than 14 days following
its issuance.
(3) A person who receives a citation and fails to
appear on or before the time and date and at the court
liability.
1987 specified is subject to arrest. The magistrate may issue a warrant of arrest.
77-7-14. Person causing detention or arrest of
) (a) Except where otherwise provided by law, a
person suspected of shoplifting or licitation or information issued for violations of
brary theft — Civil and criminal immuTitle 41 shall state that the person receiving the
nity.
citation or information shall appear before the
(1) A peace officer, merchant, or merchant's emmagistrate who has jurisdiction over the offense
ployee, servant, or agent who causes the detention of
charged.
a person as provided in Section 77-7-12, or who causes
(b) If the citation or information is issued for
the arrest of a person for theft of goods held or disan offense under the jurisdiction of the justice
played for sale, is not criminally or civilly liable
courts and occurs within the geographical boundwhere he has reasonable and probable cause to bearies of any municipality or county precinct
lieve the person detained or arrested committed a
where a justice court exists and a justice court
theft of goods held or displayed for sale.
judge is currently serving, that court is the mag(2) A peace officer or employee of a library who
istrate before whom the person shall appear.
causes a detention or arrest of a person under Part 8,
(c) However, consistent with Section 78-4-5,
Chapter 6, Title 76, Library Theft, is not criminally
informations or citations issued for driving under
or civilly liable where he has reasonable and probable
the influence of alcohol or drugs, driving with
cause to believe that the person committed a theft of
blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08
library materials.
1987
grams or greater, and reckless driving may be
if
filed and tried in the circuit court in the county
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and I
where the offense occurred without regard to the
question suspect — Grounds.
I
location of the offense within the county.
A peace officer may stop any person in a public I (5) Any justice court judge may, upon the motion of
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe •either the defense attorney or prosecuting attorney,
he has committed or is in the act of committing or is •based on a lack of jurisdiction or the disqualification
attempting to commit a public offense and may de- Jof the judge, transfer cases to the nearest justice court
mand his name, address and an explanation of his •or the nearest circuit court within the county, except
actions.
i9so •those cases filed under municipal ordinances.

77-17-1
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he, and recommendations for future treatment
The Board of Pardons shall direct that the defendant serve any or all of the unexpired term of the
sentence at the state prison, or place the defendant on parole If the Board ofPardon8y pursuant
to law or administrative rule, considers for parole
any defendant who has been adjudged guilty and
mentally ill, the board shall consult with the
treating facility or agency and an additional report on the condition of the defendant may be
filed with the board Pending action of the board,
the defendant shall remain at the facility to
which he was committed If the defendant is
placed on parole, treatment shall, upon the recommendation of t h a t facility, be made a condition of parole, and failure to continue treatment
or other condition of parole except by agreement
with the designated facility and the Board of Pardons is a basis for initiating parole violation
hearings The period of parole may not be less
t h a n five years, or until the expiration of the defendant's sentence, whichever comes first, and
may not be reduced without consideration by the
Board of Pardons of a current report on the mental health status of the offender
(5) If a defendant who pleads or is found guilty
and mentally ill is placed on probation under the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court, the trial
judge shall make treatment a condition of probation if the defendant is shown to be treatable and
facilities exist for treatment of the offender m a
probation status Reports as specified by the trial
judge shall be filed with the probation officer and
the sentencing court Failure to continue treatment or other condition of probation, except by
agreement with the treating agency and the sentencing court, is a basis for the initiation of probation violation hearings The period of probation may not be less than five years, or until the
expiration of the defendant's sentence, whichever
comes first, and may not be reduced by t h e sentencing court without consideration of a current
report on the mental health status of the offender Treatment or other care may be provided
by an agency or division of the Department of
H u m a n Services, or with the approval of the sentencing court, by any other handicapped services
provider A report shall be filed with the probation officer and the sentencing court every three
months during the period of probation If a motion on a petition to discontinue probation is
made by the defendant, the probation officer
shall request a report A motion on a petition to
discontinue probation may not be heard more
than once every six months
1991
CHAPTER 17
THE TRIAL
Section
77-17-1
77-17-2
77-17-3
77-17-4
77-17-5
77-17-6

Doubt as to degree — Conviction only on
lowest
Discharging one of several defendants —
To testify for state
Discharge for insufficient evidence
Conspiracy — Pleading — Evidence —
Proof necessary
Proof of corporate existence or powers
generally
Lottery tickets — Evidence

Section
77-17-7
77-17-8
77-17-9
77 17-10
77-17-11
77-17-12

204

Conviction on testimony of accomplice
— Instruction to jury
Mistake in charging offense — Procedure
Separation or sequestration of jurors —
Oath of officer having custody
Court to determine law, the jury, the
facts
J u r y to retire for deliberation — Oath of
officer having custody
Defendant on bail appearing for trial
may be committed

77-17-1.

D o u b t a s to d e g r e e — C o n v i c t i o n only
on lowest.
When it appears the defendant has committed a
public offense and there is reasonable doubt as to
which of two or more degrees he is guilty, he shall be
convicted only of the lower degree
i960
77-17-2.

D i s c h a r g i n g o n e of s e v e r a l defendants
— To testify for s t a t e .
When two or more persons are included m t h e same
charge, the court may at any time, on the application
of the prosecuting attorney, direct any defendant to
be discharged or his case severed so t h a t he may be a
witness for the prosecution
1980
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77-17-3. D i s c h a r g e for insufficient e v i d e n c e .
When it appears to the court t h a t there is not suffi-1
cient evidence to put a defendant to his defense, it
shall forthwith order him discharged
1990 |
77-17-4.

Conspiracy — Pleading — Evidence — t
Proof necessary.
On a trial for conspiracy in a case where an overt
act is necessary to constitute the offense, the defendant shall not be convicted unless one or more overt
acts are expressly alleged in the information or indictment, and unless one of the acts alleged has been
proved However, proof of overt acts not alleged m a j
be given in evidence
1980
77-17-5.

Proof of corporate e x i s t e n c e or p o w e r s
generally.
In a criminal case the existence, constitution or
powers of any corporation may be proved by general
reputation, or by the printed statutes of the state,
government or country by which this corporation was
created
1980
77-17-6. L o t t e r y t i c k e t s — E v i d e n c e .
(1) On a trial for violation of any of t h e lottery
provisions of the Utah Criminal Code, it is not necessary to prove
(a) The existence of any lottery in which any
lottery tickets shall purport to have been issued,
(b) The actual signing of any ticket or share,
or pretended share of any pretended lottery, or
(c) That any lottery ticket, share or interest
was signed or issued by the authority of any
manager, or of any person assuming to have authority as manager
(2) In all cases, proof of the sale, furnishing, bartering or procuring of any lottery ticket, share or interest therein, or of any instrument purporting to be
a ticket, or part or share of any ticket shall be evidence that the share or interest was signed and issued according to its purport
1980
77-17-7.

Conviction on testimony of a c c o m p l i c e
— Instruction to jury.
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There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals is a court of record and
shall have a seal
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N u m b e r of j u d g e s — 'I'urnis - Ftinat i o n s — Filing fees.
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges.
The term of appointment to office as a judge of t h e
Court of Appeals is until the first general election
held more t h a n three years after the effective date of
the appointment. Thereafter, the term of office of a
judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and commences on the first Monday in J a n u a r y , next following the date of election. A judge whose term expires
may serve, upon request of the Judicial Council, until
a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding
judge of t h e Court of Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction
thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for t h e selection of a chair for each panel. The
Court of Appeals m a y not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a
presiding judge from among the members of the court
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is
elected. A presiding judge of t h e Court of Appeals
may serve in t h a t office no more t h a n two successive
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for
a n acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or
incapacity of t h e presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges

C o u r t of A p p e a l s j u r i s d i c t i o n 1*< ne»until J a n u a r y 1, 1992).
The Citari '^ Appeals has jurisdiction to issut
1
aorum<in. .vni*< id to issue all writs and prou cessarv
a) !,(• e a r n mi » - *Wi *T -di nenus .iiM-i0
Hid decrees*, or
<bt in aid of its juribdictuji.
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
ng jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, oven
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from t h e district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil,!
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
i
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of^
political subdivisions of the state or other lo%
cal agencies; and
,
(ii) a challenge to agency action 'under
Section 63-46a-12.1;

wsmkaUm

wmw*m

(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except
those from the small claims department of a tir-j,JjUit court:
. ,.,.1
(e) interlocutory appeals from a n y court of
record in criminal cases, except those involving s
charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from district court in criminal
cases, except those involving a conviction of a c
first degree or capital felony;
\
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are in-jj
carcerated or serving any other criminal sen-.^
tence, except petitions constituting a challenge to>.
a conviction of or t h e sentence for a first degree*',
or capital felony;
ly
(h) appeals from, district court involving do- j
mestic relations cases, including, b u t not limited ^
to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and r^ater-'./:
:
nity;
*}
(i) appeals from t h e U t a h Military Court; and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals
from the Supreme Court.
,-$
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify,?
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review
and determination any m a t t e r over which t h e CoiH
of Appeals h a s original appellate jurisdiction.
;
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review of (^
agency adjudicative proceedings
"•"" ^
Court of A p p e a l s jurisdict.
*
s
fective J a n u a r y 1, 1992].
(1) The Court of Appeals h a s jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro-4
cess necessary:
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statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are
cited.
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction
of the appellate court.
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review and the standard of appellate review for
each issue with supporting authority for each issue.
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative shall be set out verbatim
with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent
part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone
will suffice, and in that event, the provision shall
be set forth as provided in paragraph (0 of this
I
(7) A statement of the case. The statement
I
shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case,
I
the course of proceedings, and its disposition in
I
the court below. A statement of the facts relevant
I
to the issues presented for review shall follow.
I
All statements of fact and references to the pro[
ceedings below shall be supported by citations to
^^JherecoroMseeDaraffraplMe))^^^^^^^^^^^
r"" l,l ^j?H3ffnma7y"cT 1 ^^
arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually
made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a
mere repetition of the heading under which the
argument is arranged.
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain
the contentions and reasons of the appellant with
respect to the issues presented, with citations to
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record
relied on.
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee
shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of
this rule, except that a statement of the issues or of
the case need not be made unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in
reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee
has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues
presented by the cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be
limited to answering any new matter set forth in the
opposing brief. No further briefs may be filed except
with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will
be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep
to a minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee". It promotes clarity to use the designations used in the lower court or
in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of
parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee,"
"the injured person," "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original record
as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb), to pages of the
reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement of
the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to
exhibits shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is
made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made to the pages of the
transcript at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or rejected.
(f) Reproduction of opinions, statutes, rules,
regulations, documents, etc.

Rule 25

(1) Any opinion, memorandum of decision,
findings of fact, conclusions of law, or order pertaining to the issues on appeal and any jury instructions or other part of the record of central
importance to the determination of the appeal
shall be reproduced in the brief or in an addendum to the brief.
(2) If determination of the issues presented requires the study of statutes, rules, regulations,
etc., or relevant parts thereof, to the extent not
set forth under subparagraph (a)(6) of this rule,
they shall be reproduced in the brief or in an
addendum at the end, or they may be supplied to
the court in pamphlet form.
(g) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the
court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and
>reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum containing statutes, rules,
regulations, or portions of the record as required by
paragraph (0 of this rule.
(h) Briefs in c a s e s involving cross-appeals. If a
cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of
appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes
of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise
"rigree or the court otherwise orders. The brief of the
appellee shall contain the issues and arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to
the brief of the appellant.
(i) Briefs in c a s e s involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than one
appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join
in a single brief, and any appellant or appellee may
adopt by reference any part of the brief of another.
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When
pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a
party may promptly advise the clerk of the appellate
court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme
Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be
filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the
letter shall without argument state the reasons for
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be
made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly
limited.
(k) Requirements a n d sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or
scandalous matters. Briefs which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer.
(I) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of
heavy cover stock and shall comply with Rule 27.
Rule 25. Brief of an a m i c u s curiae or guardian
ad litem.
A brief of an amicus curiae or of a guardian ad
litem representing a minor who is not a party to the
appeal may be filed only if accompanied by written
consent of all parties, or by leave of court granted on
motion or at the request of the court. A motion for
leave shall identify the interest of the applicant and
shall state the reasons why a brief of an amicus
curiae or the guardian ad litem is desirable. Except
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is tio.ttm i" !>• ujffii «iit u r,j< • IM;I -.red of tht couit
alter a verdict »f guilty. an\ other judge of that court
or any judge assigned by the prosid-.ng office* >r ** «
Judicial Council may perlorm those duties
i c If the prosecution or a defendant in anv ciinn
nal action or proceeding files an affidavit that the
jud(»* before wh im the action or proceeding is Lo be
tn*"' .»r heard ' is a mat* or prejudice, either against
**!>• or hi .ittornev or in favor of anv opposing
o tht su *, thn judge shall proceed no further
until the chali*'«ige is disposed of Every affidavit
shall statue the i.i I s and the reasons for the belief that
th» l MS or prejudice exists and shall be filed as soon
> - . cticable after the case has been assigned or the
prejudio is known No affidavit may be filed
acromp^' ted bv a certificate of counsel of
ne Fida\-t ,md appln*aii< r ire m.Hie in
t. . . :ht

^ifh

enter an order directing ? hat a
tified to another named judge ot u., ..«. • i< cum t ur 01 a
court of like jurisdiction, which judge shall then pass
upon the legal sufficiency of the allegations. If the
challenged judge does not question the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, or if the
' >m the
affidavit is certified finds that i
***< f
another judge shall be called t
conduct the proceeding. If the ju<
davit is certified does not find tne allidav
be
legally sufficient, he shall enter a finding to that effect and the challenged judge shall pr< ^ * « • ! • t i n case or proceeding.
(e) (i) If the prosecution or a defendant in a criminal action believes that a fair and impartial trial
cannot be had in the jurisdiction where the action is pending, either may, by motion, supported
by an affidavit setting forth facts, ask to have the
trial of the case transferred to another jurisdiction.
(ii) If the court is satisfied that the representations made in the affidavit are true and justify
transfer of the case, the court shall enter an order
for the removal of the case to the court of another
jurisdiction free from the objection and all

1 \>

records pertaining to the case shall be transferred forthwith to the court in the other county.
If the court is not satisfied that the representations so made justify transfer of the case, the
court shall either enter an order denying the
transfer or order a formal hearing in court; to
resolve the matter and receive further evidence
with respect to the alleged prejudice.
(f) When a change of judge or place of t n a : is « rdered all documents of record concerning the ca.-e
shall be transferred without delay to the juch't- who
shall hear the case.
Rule 30. Errors and defects.
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance
which does not affect the substantial rights of a party
| shall be disregarded.
.
yv) Clerical imsuiiies m juugmeiits, uruers ur uuier
parts of the record and errors in the record arising
from oversight or omission mav be corrected by the
• ourt at any time and afirr -un, noli; • if any, as the
. ourt may order.
Rule .J; KuU-> i-~ * -MM*
District ci-i ;-T: tijid circuit courts ma\ make local
rules for the • <»nd»ji-t of criminal proceedings not income-lent with these rules and statutes of the state.
Copico of all rules made by a court shall, upon promulgation, be furnished to the Supreme Court and to
the Judicial Council and shall be made available to
members of the state bar and the public Circun
courts promulgating rules shall send copies thereof 1
the district court having appellate jurisdiction
If no procedure is specifically prescribed b\ T 1 *
the court may proceed in any lawful manner r <•* in
consistent with these rules or «-*at'it/>,.
Rule 32. M i n u t e e n t r y .
The case file shall include copies of all minute entries of proceedings and orders made in that case.
ilnU-
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room,
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the conduct of officers, parties, spectators and ^ .*
nesses prior to and during the conduct of anv pm< *-**o
ing.

